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Note  
The Future of the US–EU Covered Agreement: 
How to Drag an Absurdly Federalist Regulatory 
System into the Global Reinsurance Marketplace 
Bailey Stubbe 
The US–EU Covered Agreement (“Covered Agreement”) is a 
bilateral agreement between the United States (“US”) and the 
European Union (“EU”) that puts in place regulations that will 
govern the insurance and reinsurance industries in those 
regions.1 This agreement represents an early step towards what 
will likely become a more standardized and integrated approach 
to international regulation of insurance markets. This note will 
give the context and background necessary to understand the 
Covered Agreement, explain the main provisions of the Covered 
Agreement, analyze criticisms and next steps, and advocate for 
a specific implementation of the Covered Agreement. 
Section One explains how reinsurance functions. Section 
Two is a discussion of traditional insurance market regulations 
in the US and the EU followed by a comparison of the two 
systems as they currently stand. Section Three gives a 
background on covered agreements generally and how they 
function. This section also introduces the key provisions of the 
US–EU Covered Agreement and possible implementations of the 
Covered Agreement. Finally, Section Four explores concerns 
raised about the Covered Agreement, counters those concerns, 
and provides a defense of the Covered Agreement as a beneficial 
step forward for the EU and especially the US. Despite the issues 
raised by some regulators and insurance companies, ultimately, 
 
  Bailey Stubbe is a 2019 J.D. candidate. She would like to thank her 
family for their incredible support during her law school career. 
 1. Fact Sheet: Bilateral Agreement between the European Union and the 
United States of America on Prudential Measures Regarding Insurance and 
Reinsurance, U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY (Jan. 13, 2017), https://www.treasury.
gov/initiatives/fio/reports-and-notices/Documents/Covered-Agreement-Fact-
Sheet-(011317)-FINAL.PDF. 
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the substance of the Covered Agreement is fair and positive for 
the US and should be implemented as soon as possible by the 
individual states. 
I. REINSURANCE: BACKGROUND AND PURPOSE 
The Covered Agreement mainly focuses on regulations for 
reinsurance. Reinsurance is insurance purchased by insurance 
companies (health, home, auto, life, disability, liability) against 
the risk of claims that the insurers must pay.2 It is, essentially, 
insurance for insurance companies. It represents an important 
solvency management tool that almost all insurance companies 
use. There are specific reinsurance companies, but many general 
insurance companies have reinsurance departments and they all 
reinsure each other’s claims.3 The insurance company buying 
the reinsurance is known as the “cedent” or “ceding insurer.”4 
Reinsurance serves multiple purposes. First, it limits a 
cedent’s risk and losses (the reason individuals buy insurance). 
The risk these companies are insuring against is that the 
premiums they charge policyholders will be less than the claims 
they must pay out on those policies.5 Having reinsurance also 
increases the cedent’s underwriting capacity.6 Underwriting 
capacity is the “maximum amount of loss exposure insured by 
the insurer.” 7 Insurers can cover higher risk or higher value 
policies when they know they have reinsurance protection. 
Reinsurance also promotes a more efficient allocation of an 
insurer’s capital.8 Much of an insurer’s capital comes from the 
premiums they receive on policies. Insurers need to retain some 
of those funds in reserve accounts, set aside to pay out claims as 
 
 2. NAIC REINSURANCE TASK FORCE OF THE FINANCIAL CONDITION (E) 
COMMITTEE, U.S. REINSURANCE COLLATERAL WHITE PAPER 4 (Mar. 5, 2006) (“A 
ceding insurer transfers risk to an assuming reinsurer, the insurance company 
that assumes all or part of the risk of one or more insurance policies issued by 
the cedent.”). 
 3. See Top 50 Global Reinsurance Groups, REINSURANCE NEWS, 
https://www.reinsurancene.ws/top-50-reinsurance-groups/. 
 4. Cedent, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 5. FED. INS. OFF., U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, THE BREADTH AND SCOPE 
OF THE GLOBAL REINSURANCE MARKET AND THE CRITICAL ROLE SUCH MARKET 
PLAYS IN SUPPORTING INSURANCE IN THE UNITED STATES 1 (Dec. 2014). 
 6. Id. 
 7. Underwriting, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 8. NAIC, supra note 2, at 5. 
2019] US–EU COVERED AGREEMENT 219 
they arise.9 With reinsurance protection, insurers have the 
flexibility to use more of the capital in the business instead of 
saving it to pay out claims. Reinsurance is most useful for risks 
with a low probability of occurrence, but a high cost if they do 
occur.10 
II.         INTRODUCTION TO TRADITIONAL 
INSURANCE REGULATION 
This section outlines the historical development of 
insurance regulation in the US and EU systems as well as the 
main differences between the two regulatory systems. 
A. THE EU SYSTEM 
The primary regulatory framework in the EU for insurance 
and reinsurance is Solvency II.11 It primarily regulates solvency, 
which, in the insurance sphere, is the ability of insurers to meet 
their claim obligations to policyholders.12 Solvency II is a council 
directive that came into effect in 2009.13 Before Solvency II, the 
EU insurance and reinsurance markets were governed by 
Solvency I, which was established in 1973.14 Solvency II 
modernized insurance regulation by identifying additional risks 
that were not captured under Solvency I, and by making 
requirements more risk-sensitive. The Solvency II directive has 
three main pillars. The first is a system of risk-based capital 
requirements where insurance companies undergo risk profiles 
and are thus required to maintain specific capital requirements 
based on their determined level of risk.15 The second pillar is 
market discipline, or governance and risk management 
requirements.16 This provides for a transparent governance 
 
 9. Claims Reserve, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/
claims-reserve.asp (last visited Sept. 27, 2018). 
 10. Examples of risks include natural disasters and other catastrophes.
INT’L ASS’N OF INS. SUPERVISORS, REINSURANCE AND FINANCIAL STABILITY 19 
(2012). 
 11. Council Directive 2009/138, art. 1, 2009 O.J. (L 335) (EC). 
 12. FED. INS. OFF., U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, HOW TO 
MODERNIZE AND IMPROVE THE SYSTEM OF INSURANCE REGULATION IN THE 
UNITED STATES 23 (Dec. 2013). 
 13. Council Directive 2009/138, supra note 11, at 1. 
 14. Council Directive 73/239, art. 1, 1973 O.J. (EC). 
 15. Council Directive 2009/138, supra note 11, at 28. 
 16. Id. at 34. 
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system where insurance companies need to conduct regular 
“Own Risk Solvency Assessments” (ORSAs).17 An ORSA is an 
internal process where insurers self-assess their risk 
management for all reasonably foreseeable risks (credit, market, 
liquidity, underwriting, etc.) and analyze their present and 
future solvency positions.18 The elements of an ORSA analysis 
are: “(i) a description of the insurance or reinsurance group’s risk 
management framework; (ii) an assessment of the insurance or 
reinsurance group’s risk exposure; and (iii) a group assessment 
of risk capital and a prospective solvency assessment.”19 The 
third pillar of Solvency II is supervisory reporting and public 
disclosure. Companies must make reports to the supervisory 
authority body created in the Solvency II directive and make 
regular disclosures to the public.20 
B.  THE US SYSTEM 
The US insurance regulatory scheme is unique in the 
international community. Insurance regulation in the US is left 
mainly to the states, which leads to multiple—sometimes 
conflicting—regulations, instead of one set of national 
regulations with one national supervisory enforcement body, 
which most countries have. 21 There exists some degree of 
uniformity because of standard-setting and oversight by the 
National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) but 
control remains firmly in the hands of the states.22 
The origins of state insurance regulation are strongly 
shaped by two major cases and one important piece of 
legislation. In 1868, the Supreme Court decided, in Paul v. 
Virginia, that insurance is not commerce and therefore the 
federal government cannot regulate it through its commerce 
 
 17. Id. 
 18. Own Risk Solvency Assessment, NAIC CTR. FOR INS. POL’Y & RES. (Apr. 
9, 2018), https://www.naic.org/cipr_topics/topic_own_risk_solvency_assessment
.htm. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Council Directive 2009/138, supra note 11, at 36. 
 21. David Zaring, It is time to Rethink Insurance Regulation, N.Y. TIMES 
(Jan. 22, 2014), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/01/22/it-is-time-to-rethink-
insurance-regulation/ (“[T]he American system of insurance regulation, where 
the federal role is minimal and each state has a different regulatory regime.”). 
 22. See State Insurance Regulation, NAIC CTR. FOR INS. POL’Y & RES. 
(2011), https://www.naic.org/documents/topics_white_paper_hist_ins_reg.pdf 
(explaining the function of the NAIC in state insurance regulation). 
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clause power.23 The opinion stated that, “[i]ssuing a policy of 
insurance is not a transaction of commerce.”24 The reasoning 
was that insurance policies are essentially local, personal 
contracts of indemnity and are not interstate transactions, even 
if the parties are in different states.25 It was not until 1944 that 
the Supreme Court reversed this decision in the South Eastern 
Underwriters Association (SEUA) case, and decided that 
insurance is commerce that can be regulated by Congress.26 The 
Supreme Court stated that even though insurance contracts 
themselves are local in nature, they create a chain of events that 
becomes interstate commerce.27  In reaction to the SEUA 
case, Congress passed the McCarran-Ferguson Act in 1945. 
“Several Congressmen had reacted to the South-Eastern 
Underwriters litigation . . . these congressman introduced 
legislation that would have completely exempted the insurance 
industry from antitrust laws . . . Senators McCarran and 
Ferguson introduced an amended version of this proposal.”28 
This Act contains a reverse preemption clause, which states that 
“[n]o Act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair or 
supersede any law enacted by any State for the purpose of 
regulating the business of insurance.”29 This provision ensures 
that federal laws that do not expressly regulate the “business of 
insurance” will not preempt state insurance laws.30 Another 
major piece of legislation which affects insurance regulation in 
the US is the Dodd-Frank Act. Dodd-Frank created the Federal 
Insurance Office (FIO) within the Department of the Treasury.31 
The FIO was created to “monitor all aspects of the insurance 
industry, including identifying issues or gaps in the regulation 
 
 23. Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. 168 (1868). 
 24. Id. at 183. 
 25. Id. 
 26. United States v. S.E. Underwriters Ass’n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944). 
 27. Id. at 547. 
 28. Alan M. Anderson, Insurance and Antitrust Law: The McCarran-
Ferguson Act and Beyond, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 85–86 (1983). 
 29. McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C, §§ 1011–1015 (1945). 
 30. See Anderson, supra note 28, at 90 (“[The] three-prong test for 
determining whether an insurer’s activity is within the business of insurance: 
the first prong examines whether the activity involves the underwriting or 
spreading of risk; the second prong focuses on whether the activity involves the 
insurer-insured relationship; and the third prong, as refined in Pireno, asks 
whether the activity is limited to entities within the insurance industry, thus 
conforming to the legislative intent of the Act.”). 
 31. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, H.R. 
4173; P.L. 111–203 (2010) (“Dodd-Frank”). 
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of insurers that could contribute to a systemic crisis in the 
insurance industry or the US financial system.”32 Importantly, 
this body monitors but does not regulate.33 The FIO does not 
have the power to enforce regulations on insurance companies 
apart from requiring disclosure and access for the purpose of 
monitoring.34 
State solvency regulation is largely coordinated by the 
NAIC.35 This group of state insurance commissioners creates 
model laws and regulations that state legislatures can choose to 
adopt.36 These model rules pertain to all aspects of insurance 
regulation, but the most widely adopted are the solvency rules, 
which are almost unanimously codified by the states.37 These 
solvency rules are so widely adopted because of the NAIC’s 
regulation equivalency system for solvency regulation.38 States 
that participate in the program and adopt the NAIC’s model 
solvency laws only need to be regulated by their home state 
authority, and do not need to be regulated by every state they do 
business in because the participating states’ insurance 
regulatory programs are considered to be equivalent.39 Like 
Solvency II in the EU, the NAIC solvency regulations require 
insurers to perform regular ORSA’s to self-analyze their 
solvency and risk levels.40 
 
 32. Id. § 313. 
 33. Federal Insurance Office (FIO), NAIC CTR. FOR INS. POL’Y & RES. (July 
13, 2018), https://www.naic.org/cipr_topics/topic_fio.htm (“FIO does not have 
supervisory or regulatory authority over the business of insurance.”). 
 34. See About FIO, U.S. DEP’T TREASURY (JUNE 12, 2013), 
treasury.gov/initiatives/fio/about-fio (“In addition to advising the Secretary of 
the Treasury [] on major domestic and prudential international insurance 
policy . . . FIO is specifically authorized to: monitor all aspects of the insurance 
industry, including identifying issues or gaps in the regulation of insurers that 
could contribute to a systemic crisis in the insurance industry or the U.S. 
financial system.”). 
 35. See About the NAIC, NAIC CTR. FOR INS. POL’Y & RES., 
https://www.naic.org/index_about.htm (last visited Sept. 25, 2018) (describing 
the functions of the NAIC). 
 36. See id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. See State Insurance Regulation, supra note 22, at 5 (explaining the 
NAIC’s solvency equivalency system); NAIC MODEL LAWS, REGULATIONS AND 
GUIDELINES § III-390 (1999) at 3. 
 39. See NAIC MODEL LAWS § III-390, supra note 38. 
 40. NAIC MODEL LAWS, REGULATIONS AND GUIDELINES § III-505 2012). 
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C. COMPARISON OF THE US AND EU INSURANCE 
REGULATORY SYSTEMS 
The main difference between EU and US insurance 
regulation is that in the US there is relatively little regulation 
of insurance on the national level. Most regulation is done by the 
states, which can lead to international insurers following 
multiple regulations if they wish to operate in the US.41 Another 
challenge for the US is that it brings so many people to the 
international insurance negotiating table. State insurance 
regulators want to be present because they are the ones that 
make the regulations.42 The NAIC wants to be included as a 
representative of the states.43 The leaders of FIO also want to be 
present as the national insurance supervisors.44 These 
competing interests can make international negotiations more 
difficult. 
Both the EU and the US have implemented ORSA 
procedures and graduated capital requirements where 
companies evaluated to have higher risk levels are required to 
hold more capital to ensure that they can adequately pay their 
claims.45 
III. INTRODUCTION TO THE US–EU COVERED 
AGREEMENT 
A.  COVERED AGREEMENTS GENERALLY 
The notion of a covered agreement was first included in 
Dodd-Frank.46 It creates the authority for the Treasury 
Department and the US Trade Representative (USTR) to 
 
 41. See Fact Sheet: Bilateral Agreement between the European Union and 
the United States of America on Prudential Measures Regarding Insurance and 
Reinsurance, supra note 1 (“In the United States, state insurance regulators 
have general authority over the business of insurance (including reinsurance)”). 
 42. See State Insurance Regulation, supra note 22, at 2 (“State legislatures 
are the public policymakers that establish set broad policy for the regulation of 
insurance”). 
 43. See About the NAIC, supra note 35. 
 44. See About FIO, supra note 34. 
 45. Council Directive 2009/138, supra note 11; OWN RISK AND SOLVENCY 
ASSESSMENT (ORSA) (E) SUBGROUP OF THE FINANCIAL CONDITION (E) 
COMMITTEE, NAIC OWN RISK AND SOLVENCY ASSESSMENT (ORSA) GUIDANCE 
MANUAL (July 2014). 
 46. Dodd-Frank, supra note 31 at §531 
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address areas where state insurance laws treat US insurers 
differently than non-US insurers.47 
1.  The Process for Entering into a Covered 
Agreement 
The USTR and FIO negotiate the covered agreement 
jointly.48 Throughout the process they consult several 
congressional committees and update the committees on the 
nature of the agreement, how it will achieve the purpose of the 
Dodd-Frank Act, and how the eventual implementation of the 
covered agreement will affect state laws.49 Before the agreement 
can go into effect it must be submitted to the House Financial 
Services Committee, House Ways and Means Committee, the 
Senate Banking Committee, and the Senate Finance 
Committee.50 There is then a ninety-day waiting period after 
which the agreement can enter into force.51 
2.  Covered Agreement Preemption 
Under Dodd-Frank, covered agreements “can serve as a 
basis for preemption of a state law under certain circumstances 
if the agreement relates to measures substantially equivalent to 
the protections afforded consumers under state law.”52 This 
means current state laws that have collateral requirements for 
EU reinsurance companies could be invalidated if the FIO 
Director determines that they are inconsistent with the Covered 
Agreement.53 A covered agreement will serve to overcome the 
reverse preemption clause in the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 
requiring that the states follow the rules of the Covered 
Agreement as long as those rules afford consumers the same 
protections they would get under state law.54 
 
 47. Key Issue: The National System of State Regulation and Covered 
Agreement, NAIC CTR. FOR INS. POL’Y & RES. (July. 10, 2018), 
https://www.naic.org/cipr_topics/topic_covered_agreement.htm. 
 48. Id. 
 49. NAIC GOV’T REL., COVERED AGREEMENT ON REINSURANCE CONSUMER 
PROTECTION COLLATERAL at 2 (2016). 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. at 2 (describing the effects of the Covered Agreement on the states). 
 54. Id. 
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B. KEY PROVISIONS OF THE COVERED AGREEMENT 
The US–EU Covered Agreement has three main focuses for 
international prudential insurance regulation: reinsurance, 
group supervision, and free exchange of information between 
insurance supervisors.55 
1. Reinsurance 
The Covered Agreement provisions related to reinsurance 
are centered on the elimination of capital requirements that the 
US currently imposes on EU reinsurers.56 Foreign reinsurance 
companies that operated in the US historically were required to 
hold 100% collateral for risks assumed from US insurers.57 This 
was done to make sure the reinsurance companies had enough 
capital to pay any claims that arose. Because of the way 
reinsurance works, the occasions when reinsurance companies 
have to pay out claims tend to be less predictable, large-scale 
events, like natural disasters. Therefore, it is especially 
important for reinsurance companies to be sufficiently 
capitalized to pay claims.58 However, a 100% collateral 
requirement forces reinsurance companies to hold a substantial 
amount of capital on their books that is unavailable for investing 
or other purposes.59 
Under the US–EU Covered Agreement, US and EU 
regulatory bodies can no longer hold collateral requirements, or 
other requirements with the same effect. Neither party is 
allowed to 
(a) maintain or adopt any requirement to post collateral 
in connection with cessions from a Host Party Ceding 
Insurer to a Home Party Assuming Reinsurer and any 
related reporting requirement attributable to such 
 
 55. Bilateral Agreement Between the United States of America and the 
European Union on Prudential Measures Regarding Insurance and 
Reinsurance, art. 5–8, Eur. Union-U.S., Sept. 22, 2017, T.I.A.S. 18-0404 
[hereinafter US-EU Covered Agreement]. 
 56. Fact Sheet: Bilateral Agreement between the European Union and the 
United States of America on Prudential Measures Regarding Insurance and 
Reinsurance, supra note 1. 
 57. NAIC GOV’T REL., supra note 49, at 1. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
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removed collateral, or (b) maintain or adopt any new 
requirement with substantially the same regulatory 
impact on the Home Party Assuming Reinsurer as 
collateral requirements removed under this Agreement 
or any reporting requirement attributable to such 
removed collateral.60 
Because ending collateral requirements removes a level of 
assurance that claims will be paid, the Covered Agreement 
implements new group supervision requirements. The idea is 
that if the solvency regulation is accurate, consumers will know 
that reinsurance companies are able to pay out their claims, so 
there will be no need for high collateral requirements. 
2.   Group Supervision   
Under the group supervision provisions, US insurers are 
relieved from following the requirements of Solvency II and its 
corresponding supervisory authorities as long as the US follows 
group capital assessment requirements, which capture the risk 
of parent companies instead of their individual subsidiary 
entities.61 As defined in the Covered Agreement, group 
supervision means “the application of regulatory and prudential 
oversight by a supervisory authority to an insurance or 
reinsurance group for purposes including protecting 
policyholders and other consumers, and promoting financial 
stability and global engagement.”62 Essentially group 
supervision is the idea that insurance companies need to be 
monitored at the “group” or parent-company level rather than 
monitoring the individual subsidiaries of the insurance or 
reinsurance company as separate entities.63 
Another important provision of Article Four on group 
supervision is the idea of Home supervisory authorities versus 
Host supervisory authorities.64 Before the Covered Agreement 
took place, an insurer that had branches in the US and the EU 
 
 60. US–EU Covered Agreement, supra note 55, at 4. 
 61. See id. (detailing group supervision requirements). 
 62. Id. at 6. 
 63. Daniel Schwarcz, A Critical Take on Group Regulation of Insurers in 
the United States, 5 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 537, 541 (2015). 
 64. See US–EU Covered Agreement, supra note 55, at 18 (describing the 
new Home/Host supervisory requirements). 
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would be regulated by both the US and the EU.65 The regulations 
varied and the supervisory authorities in each jurisdiction had 
different procedures and requested different documents.66 
Under the Covered Agreement, a US company with branches in 
the EU will only need to be regulated by the US, and an EU 
company with branches in the US will only need to be regulated 
by the EU. So, insurance companies will only need to report to 
the supervisory authority in their Home country and not in the 
Host country of their subsidiary. This is essentially a large-scale 
version of the NAIC’s state solvency equivalency program where 
insurance companies only need to be regulated in their home 
states because all the states are operating under the same 
regulations.67 
However, allowing insurance companies to report solely to 
their Home authority only works if the regulatory schemes of the 
US and the EU are deemed to be equivalent.68 While the Covered 
Agreement does reference using “equivalent documentation” 
under the group supervision requirements, the Covered 
Agreement does not explicitly state that the regulatory schemes 
are actually equivalent.69 Currently under Solvency II, EU 
insurance regulation is done at the group level.70 The US 
ostensibly started monitoring on the group level in 1969, but the 
weaknesses in their approach were made apparent after the 
2007–2008 financial crisis.71 The US approach to monitoring and 
supervision has been described as a “windows and walls” 
system.72 There are walls between the insurance subsidiaries of 
a large parent company to protect the individual insurer’s 
capital, but there are windows in those protective walls so 
 
 65. Eur. Ins. & Occupational Pensions Auth., Guidelines on the supervision 
of branches of third-country insurance undertakings, EIOPA-BoS-15/110 (Oct. 
23, 2010). 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. See US-EU Covered Agreement, supra note 55, at 19 (“Where no such 
worldwide group ORSA is applied to a Home Party insurance or reinsurance 
group, according to applicable law, the relevant US State or EU Member State’s 
supervisory authority provides equivalent documentation which is prepared 
consistent with applicable law of the Home supervisory authority . . . .”). 
 70. Council Directive 2009/138, supra note 11. 
 71. Kris DeFrain, Insurance Group Supervision, NAIC CTR. FOR INS. POL’Y 
& RES. (Apr. 2012), https://www.naic.org/cipr_newsletter_archive/vol3_ins_
group_supervision.htm. 
 72. Id. 
228 MINNESOTA JOURNAL OF INT'L LAW [Vol. 28:1 
insurance regulators can monitor the group as a whole.73 In the 
years leading up to 2007, the windows at American 
International Group, Inc. (“AIG”) must have been dirtied 
because regulators were slow to see the danger in AIG’s tangled 
subsidiaries. Problems arose because “AIG Investments loaned 
securities from the investment portfolios of AIG’s insurance 
companies to various financial institutions in exchange for cash 
collateral posted by the borrower. AIG Investments would then 
invest the collateral in debt securities to earn a return which 
would serve as compensation for lending securities.”74   
Because of this failure, the NAIC amended Model Laws 
#440 and #450.75 The new model laws give state regulators 
expanded ability to monitor holding companies that pose a risk 
to the insurance branch of that company.76 They also give 
regulators greater access to the records of the parent company.77 
The US has made strides towards more comprehensive group 
supervision. Most states have adopted at least part of the 
Insurance Holding Company model regulation.78 But in order to 
eventually be considered equivalent the US must develop a 
“Worldwide Group Capital Calculation.”79 A worldwide group 
capital calculation needs to capture the risk level of the entire 
group, which includes the parent undertaking of the insurance 
or reinsurance company.80 This risk analysis system emphasizes 
monitoring all subsidiaries and arms of a group in every country 
that they operate in in order to get a more accurate picture of 
their true risk profile.81 After the Covered Agreement was 
signed, the NAIC formed a Group Capital Calculation working 
group to develop their own group capital methodology.82 The 
working group met with the Federal Reserve Board on February 
12th, 2018 to discuss the construction of this calculation.83 
 
 73. Id. 
 74. William K. Sjostrom, Jr., The AIG Bailout, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 943, 
961 (2009). 
 75. DeFrain, supra note 71. 
 76. Id. 
 77. NAIC MODEL LAWS, REGULATIONS AND GUIDELINES § III-450 (2011). 
 78. Id. 
 79. See US–EU Covered Agreement supra note 55, at 21 (describing the 
worldwide group capital calculation). 
 80. Id. at 19. 
 81. See id. at 8 (explaining the new risk analysis system). 
 82. Group Capital Calculation (E) Working Group, NAIC, 
https://www.naic.org/cmte _e_grp_capital_wg.htm (last visited Sept. 17, 2018). 
 83. Id. 
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3. Open Exchange of Information  
The goal for the open exchange of information between 
insurance supervisors is a non-binding encouragement for 
insurance supervisors in the US and EU to share information. 
The Covered Agreement includes model provisions for 
information exchange that the insurance supervisors are 
encouraged to adopt.84 Article Five of the Covered Agreement is 
more of a brief goal statement than the other two clear directives 
in the Covered Agreement: The Parties shall encourage 
supervisory authorities in their respective jurisdictions to 
cooperate in exchanging information pursuant to the practices 
set forth in the Annex. The Parties understand that the use of 
such practices will enhance cooperation and information 
sharing, while respecting a high standard of confidentiality 
protection.85 More specific information exchange practices will 
likely be developed as the US and the EU begin the process of 
implementing the rest of the Covered Agreement. 
C. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE KEY PROVISIONS 
EU member states have twenty-four months from the 
signing of the Covered Agreement to eliminate local presence 
requirements and US companies that have not yet established 
branches in the EU do not have to do so.86 The US needs to start 
a preemption determination under Dodd-Frank within forty-two 
months of the signing of the Covered Agreement (and complete 
it within sixty months of signing) to find out whether the 
Covered Agreement preempts the laws of any states by treating 
EU insurers less favorably than US insurers.87 Because the 
individual states regulate collateral requirements, each state 
will need to individually decrease their current collateral 
requirements. Collateral requirements for EU reinsurers need 
to be decreased by at least 20% each year until the collateral 
holding requirement reaches 0%.88 
Group supervision implementation will start with a sixty-
 
 84. See About FIO, supra note 1 (discussing the new model provisions). 
 85. US–EU Covered Agreement, supra note 55, at 24. 
 86. EU/U.S. Covered Agreement: What’s Next?, HOGAN LOVELLS 9 (Feb. 
2017), hlinsurancelaw.com/files/2017/02/EU-US-Covered-Agreement-What-Ne
xt.pdf. 
 87. US–EU Covered Agreement, supra note 55, at 29. 
 88. Id. at 28. 
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month period where EU supervisory authorities will not impose 
worldwide group capital requirements on the US 89 Currently, 
US regulations do not comply with worldwide group capital 
calculations.90 During that period, the US is to “provisionally 
apply” those requirements using “best efforts” and “encouraging” 
the insurance regulation authorities of the individual states to 
follow the requirements.91 
IV. LOOKING AHEAD: POTENTIAL PROBLEMS 
AND WHY THE COVERED AGREEMENT IS 
POSITIVE DESPITE TED NICKEL’S 
OBJECTIONS 
A.  FUTURE PLANS 
The Covered Agreement was signed in September 2017 and 
the US and the EU are both in the process of determining the 
best way to implement it.92 The NAIC is currently going through 
a notice and comment period, and they held a meeting of the 
newly created Reinsurance Task Force on February 20, 2018 to 
discuss potential implementations.93 The NAIC Insurance Task 
Force took comments from state regulators and domestic 
insurance and reinsurance companies. The NAIC requested 
comments on amending NAIC Model Law #785 and Model 
Regulation #786, which will determine how best to eliminate the 
reinsurance collateral requirements for EU reinsurers as 
required by the Covered Agreement.94 
The Task Force also took comments about changing the 
criteria to allow countries to become “qualified jurisdictions” and 
allowing those qualified jurisdictions to have equivalent 
reinsurance collateral requirements to those the EU now has.95 
The Task Force is also considering extending the same EU 
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collateral and group supervision requirements to other countries 
that the US may enter into a future covered agreement with. 96 
The Task Force wants comments to inform its decision on 
whether the US should give non-EU countries a similar deal to 
the Covered Agreement and how to determine which countries 
should get those arrangements. The Task Force also requested 
comments on what safety precautions to implement to address 
solvency risks now that the old solvency precaution (collateral 
requirements) will be eliminated.97 At the hearing, the Task 
Force also asked for comments on any other considerations about 
the implementation of the Covered Agreement brought up by the 
state insurance regulatory bodies and industry players.98 
In late February of 2018 the NAIC released an update on 
the note and comment process and published the comments they 
received.99 Twenty entities submitted written comments on the 
agreement in a wide variety of areas.100 Some, like the American 
Insurance Association, proposed specific suggestions for 
implementation.101 Other groups, like the Allstate Corporation 
voiced their concerns about the effect of the agreement.102 
Pleasingly, many of the implementations suggested in the 
comments are similar to the implementation advocated for by 
this note. 
B.  POTENTIAL CONCERNS 
When the Covered Agreement was first announced in 
January 2017, the initial reaction among the affected insurance 
companies and state regulatory bodies was concern about the 
potential uncertainties that the Covered Agreement created.103 
 
 96. Id. 
 97. See id. (listing the comments the Task Force requested during the 
notice and comment period). 
 98. Id. 
 99. Roland C. Gross, The NAIC Moves to Implement the Covered Agreement, 
1, CARLTON FIELDS: REINSURANCE FOCUS (Mar. 19, 2018).), 
https://reinsurancefocus.com/data/20/1/142/136/1957625/user/2137514/htdocs/b
log/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/Special-Focus-The-NAIC-Moves-to-Implement
-the-Covered-Agreement-3.19.18.pdf. 
 100. Id. at 1–2. 
 101. Comment Letters: Covered Agreement Public Hearing Held on February 
20, 2018, NAIC (Mar. 2018), https://www.naic.org/documents/cmte_e_
reinsurance_related_180220_public_hearing_comment_letters.pdf. 
 102. Id. 
 103. US-EU Covered Agreement, supra note 55, at 2. 
232 MINNESOTA JOURNAL OF INT'L LAW [Vol. 28:1 
The state regulators were unsure about their roles in the 
implementation of the Covered Agreement.104 The Dodd-Frank 
preemption determination has a long timeframe and loose 
guidelines for implementation.105 It was unclear early on if 
states should act quickly to avoid potential preemption or if they 
should wait and then challenge any unfavorable preemption 
decisions in court.106 
When the Covered Agreement was signed in September 
2017, the US and the EU issued a joint statement and each 
issued their own individual statements to clarify the 
implementation of the Covered Agreement.107 Once the 
regulatory groups and insurance companies received the text of 
the Covered Agreement and the clarifying fact sheets, some 
decided that the Covered Agreement would provide increased 
clarity and stability and would not be as harmful as they initially 
feared. 108 There are however, still some large concerns currently 
left unresolved. One main concern of state regulatory bodies and 
the NAIC is that currently having no collateral requirements for 
reinsurance companies removes an important protection for 
consumers and could be potentially harmful for policyholders.109 
The NAIC’s other main concern is that their state laws will be 
preempted by the Covered Agreement.110 The NAIC is made up 
of state insurance commissioners and regulators and a finding 
of preemption here would carve away some of their regulatory 
power and set a precedent to carve away even more if the USTR 
enters into any future covered agreements. The NAIC voiced 
their concerns in a response brief to the announcement of the 
Covered Agreement: 
The federal government has not demonstrated benefits 
to US insurers or consumers that would warrant a 
covered agreement preempting state law. There are 
alternatives to such drastic action, including state action 
already underway. However, if Treasury and USTR 
move forward, state insurance regulators expect to be a 
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direct part of the negotiations to ensure that mutual 
recognition is not paid for with unnecessary preemption 
of state law.111 
C. TED NICKEL: OBJECTIONS AND RESPONSES 
One of the leading voices against the Covered Agreement 
was former NAIC president, Ted Nickel. The NAIC elects officers 
from their members for one-year terms.112 Ted Nickel, Wisconsin 
Commissioner of Insurance appointed by Governor Scott 
Walker, was president of the NAIC in 2017, so the USTR was in 
the process of negotiation and developing the Covered 
Agreement during his tenure.113 Nickel laid out his problems 
with the Covered Agreement in his policy setting newsletter 
“The Year Before Us: Perspectives from NAIC President Ted 
Nickel.”114 Nickel’s newsletter is a helpful framework for 
analyzing objections to the Covered Agreement because it 
outlines some of the most common concerns. One of Nickel’s 
main concerns is that the Covered Agreement treats US 
reinsurance companies operating in the EU unfairly. In the 
newsletter he writes: 
Fellow regulators and I are concerned with the disparate 
treatment some EU jurisdictions are imposing on US 
insurers. State insurance regulators are committed to 
reaching accord on a system of mutual recognition 
without any jurisdiction imposing its values and 
regulatory systems on another. Both US and EU insurers 
deserve to receive fair and equal treatment. There should 
be no disadvantage to an EU insurer doing business in 
the US Similarly, a US insurer should not be 
disadvantaged when it operates in the EU.115 
This worry of disparate treatment is unfounded. EU 
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regulators can and do treat US insurance companies differently 
than they treat EU insurance companies without the Covered 
Agreement. The Covered Agreement will actually end this 
disparate treatment through the new group supervision 
requirements.116 Article Four of the Covered Agreement states 
that the “Home Party insurance or reinsurance group is subject 
only to . . . its Home supervisory authorities, and is not subject 
to . . . any Host supervisory authority.”117 Under the Covered 
Agreement, EU regulators will not be able to treat US insurance 
and reinsurance companies unfairly because those companies 
will not actually be subject to EU requirements. One of the few 
regulatory powers the host country will have once the Covered 
Agreement fully enters into force is the ability to request and 
obtain information from an insurer or reinsurer in its territory 
for the purpose of prudential insurance regulation and the 
Covered Agreement encourages host territories to avoid 
burdensome or duplicative requests.118 However, the Covered 
Agreement encourages Host territories to avoid burdensome or 
duplicative requests whenever possible. 
Nickel’s next concern, that the EU will impose its “value and 
regulatory system” on US insurance and reinsurance companies, 
is similarly misguided. The only specific regulation guidelines in 
the Covered Agreement are the worldwide group ORSA 
guidelines, which both the US and the EU already followed.119 
There is a provision in Article Four that allows the Host 
supervisory authority (the EU in Nickel’s fears) to impose 
“preventive, corrective, or otherwise responsive measures” on a 
foreign reinsurer if they find that the worldwide group ORSA 
indicates that the insurance or reinsurance company “exposes 
any serious threat to policyholder protection or financial 
stability in the territory of the Host supervisory authority.”120 
However, before they can implement any of those measures, the 
Host supervisory authority needs to consult with that company’s 
Home supervisory authority.121 There is always a chance that 
the EU could impose harsh measures against US insurance 
companies despite consultation from their Home supervisory 
authority in the US. This outcome seems unlikely because a 
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party is no longer bound by their limitations under the 
agreement when the other party does not follow their limitations 
under the agreement.122 
A worry cited by Nickel and other stakeholders is that the 
Covered Agreement “needs to better protect US consumers, 
insurers, and the state‐based insurance regulatory system. Our 
system has a long track record of protecting insurance 
consumers and promoting competitive insurance markets.”123 
However, Nickel believes the US should eliminate the FIO 
(created to protect consumers through regulatory oversight), 
give states a voice in monitoring risk, and let the Treasury 
Department deal with any leftover federal coordination that 
needs to be done, so his views on consumer protection in 
insurance are slightly outside the norm.124 
The standards of protection ensured by the Covered 
Agreement make up for the consumer protections it removes.125 
While it eliminates reinsurance collateral requirements that 
protect insurance companies and requires the US to give up 
some regulatory power over European insurance companies 
operating in the US,126 the Covered Agreement sets forth 
standards for companies that will eventually hold zero 
collateral. The reinsurers must have at least $250 million (€226 
million) in capital and surplus.127 They must also have a “ratio 
of 100% SCR (solvency capital requirement) under Solvency II 
or an RBC (risk-based capital) of 300%, which means the 
companies hold $3 in capital for every $1 in risk assumed.128 The 
reinsurance companies will also have to consent to the 
jurisdiction of the Host supervisory authority and service of 
process in the Host country, and to agree to pay any final 
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judgments or enforcements sought by a ceding insurer.129 These 
standards are safeguards that provide essentially the same level 
of protection as collateral requirements and add an enforcement 
mechanism is triggered if the standards are not met, which 
actually gives consumers an extra level of protection.130 Because 
the Covered Agreement makes it so insurance and reinsurance 
companies do not need to be regulated by their host countries, 
there is a potential that consumers could lose regulatory 
protection from EU insurers operating in the US. But again, the 
Covered Agreement contemplates this danger. 
C.  WHAT THE STATES SHOULD DO 
The states have two options for what to do about the 
Covered Agreement. One, they can leave their laws the same and 
wait for FIO to make a preemption determination, invalidate 
their foreign reinsurance collateral laws, and host presence 
supervisory authority laws for running counter to the Covered 
Agreement.131 Or, two, the states can act quickly to get ahead of 
the future preemption determination. The NAIC was in the 
process of reworking their reinsurance collateral model laws 
when the Covered Agreement was signed.132 By April 2016, 
thirty-two states had passed legislation to implement these 
model laws, which allow certified reinsurers to post less than 
100% collateral.133 The NAIC developed a peer review system to 
certify foreign reinsurance oversight systems and a few 
countries within the EU have already been certified.134 The 
NAIC is likely capable of certifying the rest of the EU countries 
individually if they desired.   
Unlike the provisions in the Covered Agreement, the NAIC 
model law does not reduce collateral by a percentage and does 
not automatically decrease over time.135 Instead it gives certified 
reinsurers credit that they can use to do several things, 
including potentially decreasing required collateral.136 The 
NAIC can address this discrepancy in a number of ways. The 
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cleanest option would be to create a new model law that mirrors 
the language of Article Three in the Covered Agreement. 
Reinsurance collateral requirements would be reduced by 20% 
each year for countries in the EU.137 This regulation would have 
to be coordinated with Model Law #785 so that EU countries that 
have a better collateral rate under Model Law #785 do not have 
their percentages raised in the interim.138 The “qualified 
jurisdiction” requirements from Model Law #785 align with the 
requirements in the Covered Agreement in a lot of places so it 
will not be too much of an adjustment for reinsurers following 
those laws. Where they do not align, the requirements in Model 
Law #785 are generally a lower standard than those set forth in 
the Covered Agreement which makes the adjustment to this new 
model law less likely to raise concerns about consumer 
protection standards.139 
If the NAIC and the states implement laws in accordance 
with the Covered Agreement, they avoid going through lengthy 
preemption challenge litigation, avoid setting any precedents for 
preemption (since it has never happened before), and have more 
power in how the Covered Agreement will be implemented. All 
of these things are absolutely in the best interests of the states, 
so the NAIC and the states should act quickly to write new model 
laws for the states to adopt. 
D.  RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 
On August 6, 2018, the Reinsurance Task Force met to 
discuss proposed revisions for Model Law #785 and Model 
Regulation #786.140 The proposed revision for Model Law #785 
alters the “reciprocal jurisdiction” language to include 
jurisdictions that have “entered into a treaty or international 
agreement with the US regarding credit for reinsurance.”141 It 
also includes language providing that state insurance 
commissioners can establish other requirements for reinsurers 
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in the newly reciprocal jurisdictions, but if reinsurers do not 
comply, it “will not alter the ability of the ceding insurer to take 
credit for such reinsurance” so this part of the provision likely 
would not have a large effect on reinsurers.142 The proposed 
revisions to Model Regulation #786 essentially incorporate the 
standards and requirements set forth in the Covered Agreement 
for reinsurers that will hold zero percent collateral.143 The NAIC 
finished its comment period for the proposed revisions on July 
23, 2018 and may adjust the revisions depending on the 
comments.144 After any post-comment adjustments, NAIC will 
formally promulgate the updated model laws and individual 
states will then decide whether to adopt them. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Signing on to the Covered Agreement was a meaningful 
initial step into the global insurance and reinsurance 
marketplace for the US. Because insurance regulation seems to 
be following financial regulation in becoming more globally 
cohesive, it is important that the US participates so it has a say 
in forming policy and does not get left behind. Aligning US 
insurance regulatory policy with EU insurance regulatory policy 
is more complicated and labor intensive than it would be for 
other countries because of the United States’ unique federalist 
system, in which the individual states can set their own 
regulatory policy that can govern international deals. Despite 
concerns raised by the NAIC and state insurance regulators, the 
Covered Agreement will be positive for the US, because it 
provides equivalent protections for consumers and insurers and 
builds on the strides the US has made toward a worldwide group 
supervisory system. There is a lot yet to be decided as the states 
move towards implementation, but it is in the states’ best 
interest to embrace the agreement and take a leading role in the 
implementation process. This Covered Agreement will have 
many future benefits for insurers and consumers in the US and 
the EU. 
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